The Best Possible World? (PhD Edit)

Fleet Street, London (trekearth)


Seine River, Paris (trekearth)

J. L. Mackie and the Best Possible World Objection

The next objection Plantinga deals with is Mackie’s atheistic compatibilism[1] which, in part, assumes a perfectly good God[2] should have created, if he exists, a best possible world.[3] Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[4] Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ in Mind (1971) removes the possibility of hard determinism and postulates God could have made free creatures that only do what is right.[5] They do not have to be determined because God could have made people in a way they freely always chose what was right[6] even though, unlike Flew’s determinism,[7] wrong actions would be a technical possibility.[8] Plantinga admits it is logically possible, in a broad sense, there could be a world containing creatures that only do what is right.[9] Plantinga explains and rejects Mackie’s concept of possible worlds and does this with two main objections.[10] First, no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier.[11] Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better.[12] Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.

Plantinga’s second objection to Mackie’s best possible world idea concerns the concept of human free choice.[13] Plantinga describes Paul (1) accepting an offer, or (2) rejecting an offer.[14] Whichever choice Paul makes, either (1) or (2), God would not be able to actualize that world.[15] If Paul would make a wrong choice at any point, the problem of evil would occur, and the world would no longer be the best possible as Mackie describes.[16] To Plantinga, the result of God creating significantly free creatures is that their decisions did impact which type of world God created, and how much evil it would contain.[17] God’s omnipotence, to Plantinga, could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired.[18] Since significantly free creatures exist, it is never up to God alone in regard to which world is actualized.[19]

Augustine, like Plantinga, seemingly did assume free creatures will eventually make one wrong decision, this making Mackie’s idea that human beings could always freely choose the right seem untenable to these free will proponents.[20] At the same time, both Augustine and Plantinga would reject Mackie’s notion that if God is understood and accepted, as in traditional Christian theism, he should have created a best possible world filled with perfect creatures that never do wrong actions,[21] and because God did not do this atheism would be the preferred philosophy to adopt. Both free will advocates have stated that significantly free creatures by definition could not be guaranteed by God to avoid wrong actions,[22] and thus when wrong actions occur it is because of the human abuse of free will only.[23] God is not to be blamed for creating a good thing, that being free will, which is willfully turned towards something evil by his human creation.[24]

Feinberg

Feinberg holds to modified rationalism and a sovereignty theodicy view similar to mine which was explained in Chapter Two as the idea that God was not obligated to create anything, including a world, but chose to create purely from his own desires.[25] Within modified rationalism, the concept of a best possible world is denied in favour of the view that God chose to create the present world which was initially perfectly good.[26] The fact that the problem of evil exists would be seen within modified rationalism as a result of the free choice of human beings to rebel against God in both free will and sovereignty theodicy which both deny the notion of best possible world.[27] Modified rationalism would oppose the best possible world concepts of Leibniz from the Enlightenment era, and Mackie from the modern era.[28]

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FLEW, ANTONY (1955) ‘Theology and Falsification’, in Antony Flew and A. MacIntrye (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London, SCM, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[2] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34). Phillips (2005: 3).

[3] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[4] Leibniz (1710)(1990).

[5] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[6] LaFollette (1980: 2).

[7] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).

[8] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).

[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-64).

[11] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[12] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[13] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 39-44). LaFollette (1980: 3).

[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 40-42). There are possible worlds that God cannot actualize. LaFollette (1980: 3).

[15] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[16] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[17] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). Therefore, for Plantinga some worlds cannot be actualized. LaFollette (1980: 4).

[18] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). LaFollette (1980: 4).

[19] Geivett (1993: 196).

[20] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3).

[21] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[23] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[24] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). Plantinga (1982: 170-171). The free will theist that reasons evil is adequately explained is left with the religious problem of individual suffering, according to LaFollette. LaFollette (1980: 1).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 36).

[26] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[27] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[28] Leibniz (1710)(1990). Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33).

Wien Parlmament, Vienna (trekearth)